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Abstract 
 
In my PhD studies, I was honoured to have been introduced to the scholar Paul Ricoeur, whose 
work became central to my dissertation topic. In this paper, I share the ways in which Ricoeur’s 
conceptualizations of hermeneutic application to the human existence came to life for me. I use 
an existential event, discovering non-biological parentage, to bring forth my understanding of 
these concepts. Ricoeur’s solicitation of the hermeneutic practice allowed me to see family 
events in a new light. It is my hope through my application of Ricoeur’s work that others will 
interpret existential life events in new and exciting ways.     
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My other earliest memory is vague, no more than a distant feeling that I can sometimes seize, 
most often not. Being so dimly remembered, perhaps it came first. 
 
I became aware of a voice inside my head. What is this, I wondered. Who are you, voice? When 
will you shut up? I remembered a feeling of fright. It was only later that I realized that this voice 
was my own thinking, that this moment of anguish was my first inkling that I was a ceaseless 
monologue trapped within myself. 
 
Taken from Self, by Yann Martel, 1996
Early in my life, I became aware of the narra-
tives about my biological parentage. Being 
the only blonde, blue-eyed, small person in 
our family, people often wondered if my fa-
ther was actually my father. Since I looked 
somewhat like my mother, it was only his 
contribution that was in question. At some 
point, around the age of four or five years, I 
remember my older sister telling me I was 
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adopted. While I tried hard not to believe her, 
there were signs everywhere that this narra-
tive may actually be true. Occasionally, I 
would ask my parents if this was actual, and 
typically, they would reassure me that I was 
fully theirs. To allay my concerns my father 
would tell me stories of how the Greeks were 
originally blonde and blue-eyed until Turkey 
invaded. Hence, my “difference” was attribut-
ed to a recessive gene. I do not recall that the-
se stories ever dispelled my suspicion; a sim-
ple glance at my family could easily confirm 
the concerns I expressed. My suspicions lin-
gered throughout my life and eventually lead 
to a candid conversation with my father in my 
adulthood, prior to his death. 
 
At some point before my father died, he 
confided in me that my mother had had an 
affair and that I may not actually be his child. 
My relationship with my father had been 
rocky until I spent more time with him as an 
adult before he died. When he confirmed my 
existing suspicion, we decided that, biological 
or not, he was my father, a man I had come to 
know and admire. I put the biological parent-
age issue out of my mind for several years 
thereafter. However, after my mother died, I 
had regretted that I had not questioned her 
about the potential that my father was not my 
father and that I have a parent that may or 
may not know I exist. I suppose I hesitated 
discussing this with my mother because I typ-
ically found myself in an in-between space of 
already knowing but not wanting to confirm. 
Perhaps the decision that, regardless of biolo-
gy, he was my father was made more for him 
than me. Perhaps the lingering childhood 
signs would not be eclipsed. After thinking 
long and hard, and being encouraged by my 
partner, I decided to have DNA testing com-
plete in order to give me a more solid answer. 
It was not so much a desire to find a biologi-
cal father but rather to confirm what I already 
felt at times as a child; like I was tolerated, 
rather than I belonged.   
Since my father had already passed away, 
I had to request a DNA sample from my 
brother. My brother asked that I share the re-
sults, and knowing my family, if I shared with 
one, I shared with everyone. I agreed to share 
whatever information came my way. We re-
trieved DNA samples, submitted them to the 
laboratory, and then waited patiently for the 
results. The letter finally arrived and I anx-
iously read the statistical analysis, thinking 
“Okay, okay, but what does all this mean?!” 
Finally, after synthesising the data there was 
my answer: only a .058 probability of full sib-
ling-ship, likelihood “probability of related-
ness, maternal half-siblings.” So it was con-
firmed, my father was not my father.   
 
My initial reaction was that this infor-
mation should not really change anything. I 
already had an inkling about the results; how-
ever, I did start to hesitate when people would 
ask me about my last name and its origin. I 
would be pulled up short by questions about 
my heritage and often felt caught between an-
swering that my father was Greek, and being 
more reticent in my response, since I now 
know my father was not my father. The DNA 
testing results created a watershed moment of 
understanding self and the narratives that ex-
isted about my heritage and in particular, be-
ing a blonde Greek. I also began to wonder 
about whether my biology should or would 
trump the narratives I hold of being Greek. 
How do I understand myself now, in light of 
this new information? Does this new infor-
mation change my attestations? Do the years I 
spent thinking I was Greek suddenly vanish or 
do they continue to reside inside me? Does 
this existential event add to or limit my self-
understanding? How might Paul Ricoeur’s 
theory explain this experience and the narra-
tive self? 
 
In my address of these questions, I will 
bring to light Ricoeur’s conceptualizations, 
while using my own experiences as a thread 
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that weaves these concepts together. I must 
confess however, that given the depth and 
breadth of Ricoeur’s work, my ability to syn-
thesize his theory and my experiences within 
these pages will be limited. Ricoeur’s work 
offers a starting place for engaging the ques-
tions that surfaced for me as I confronted this 
new information. Besides highlighting Ric-
oeur’s concepts and the links to my self-
understanding, what I present are the thoughts 
and questions that were raised as I searched 
Ricoeur’s work for direction, some of which 
still linger unrequited.  
 
Why Use Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics? 
 
As I am now faced with the knowledge that 
my father was not my father, I am struck by 
the opportunity that this affords me. While the 
entire narrative about my background is not 
false, this event has fractured an existing nar-
rative about who I am and how I came to be. 
Ricoeur offers an interpretive slant that con-
siders both self and others as well as time. For 
Ricoeur (1992), hermeneutics, or interpreta-
tion, takes place indirectly and dialectically, 
by encountering symbols (reference that pro-
vide a detour) which are interpreted, reflected 
upon, and incorporated into the self. I had 
conflicting information as a child. I had the 
signs and symbols that I did not belong; after 
all I looked different. However, I also had 
dialogue from my parents that contradicted 
these signs. Hermeneutics in general is known 
as an interpretive approach to a topic that al-
lows the opening up of the world around us 
and to uncover and seek an understanding of 
the ways in which we live, engage and expe-
rience this world (Gadamer, 2004). I needed a 
hermeneutic approach to interpreting the new 
and the old and integrate the new into an en-
larged self-understanding.   
 
In his book Oneself as Another, Ricoeur 
(1992) asked, “what sort of being is the self” 
(p. 297)? By asking this question, Ricoeur 
took a critical twist in which he posited that 
knowing the self can only be accomplished 
through encountering one’s own self as well 
as others “that the selfhood of oneself implies 
otherness to such an intimate degree that one 
cannot be thought of without the other” (p. 3). 
By this statement, Ricoeur (1992) referred to 
the otherness of the self. We belong and live 
communally and, therefore, we come into 
contact with others (other than self) in the 
world who inform us, and act as a mediating 
force, which could potentially create change 
in the self, as well as our ethical actions in the 
world (Ricoeur, 1992). However, this mediat-
ing force is best accomplished when faced 
with difference; “as long as one remains with-
in the circle of sameness-identity, the other-
ness of the other than self offers nothing orig-
inal” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 3). I was clearly faced 
with difference in my family, but the narra-
tives, which had a historical grounding, acted 
as a gatekeeper to further inquiry. Ricoeur’s 
(1998) idea of self differs from the objectivist 
ontological stance; that is, things outside of us 
exist independently. Instead, Ricoeur (1992) 
understood that we are bound by the condi-
tions around us and that these conditions cre-
ate the perceptions of self and others and, 
therefore, we are created narrations. I bought 
the family narratives, for the most part, be-
cause I could then say I belonged, even if 
thoughts otherwise lingered.   
 
Additionally, I could take up his work be-
cause Ricoeur (1988) differed from others in 
his thinking about “being” in that he attempt-
ed to deal fully with the notion of time and its 
connection to our lived experience, and in or-
der to understand time, we must understand 
time as an experience. Since the chronology 
of time does not speak to our experiences of 
time, Ricoeur’s ontological curve examined 
temporal experiences in particular, the lan-
guage of time, for example in my wondering 
about the DNA results, “it didn’t matter at the 
time,” or “I wonder now.” The way we take 
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the language of time and narrate our self-
understanding was critical in Ricoeur’s later 
work, according to most Ricoeur scholars 
(e.g., Andrew, 2001; Hall, 2007; Kearney, 
2004; Langdridge, 2004; McCarty, 2007; 
Muldoon, 2002; 2006; Pellauer, 2007). I un-
derstood myself as a blonde Greek, my father 
disclosed information that increased my sus-
picions, but at the time of his disclosure, it did 
not matter. Using language such as “then” and 
“now” allow our narratives to move through 
time. Furthermore, Ricoeur’s ontological shift 
about time related to moving from the “what” 
of time to the “who” experiences time. In do-
ing so, Ricoeur was able to link time and self 
to narratives. 
 
Existential Events 
 
“Thus the imagined nothingness of the self 
becomes the existential crisis of the self.” 
(Ricoeur, 1992, p. 168) 
 
I have identified the DNA testing and the re-
sults I received as an existential event. I have 
done so because of what the event offered me. 
In some respects, this event has given me the 
opportunity to reinvent myself; to change my 
narrative, if you will. For example, I had al-
ready experienced a very challenging, diffi-
cult, and therefore, non-existent relationship 
with my older sister, and a rather disappoint-
ing relationship with my brother so when I 
received the results of my DNA test, part of 
me was elated that I was not fully connected 
to these siblings. On the other hand, I never 
wanted my older sister to be right about me 
not being a “real” member of the family, and I 
was always trying to prove that I did belong. 
What would happen to everything for which I 
fought? My attestations were false, she was 
right, where does that leave me in terms of 
this family, since we no longer have parents 
to mediate the divide? I must consider that I 
cannot simply dismiss my past, since these 
family and cultural narratives contributed to 
how I came to be who I am now. According 
to Ricoeur (1980), “no authentic anticipation 
of what we ‘may have to be’ is possible with-
out borrowing from the resources of what we 
already ‘have been’” (p. 181). I was encoun-
tering difference in my family of origin. I 
have always been different from them. I have 
the opportunity now to own my difference, 
yet maintain some family narratives since the-
se too exist.   
 
The term existential (n.d.) can be traced 
back to the work of Kierkegaard and essen-
tially means conditions of existence, and is an 
occurrence. Perhaps, then, an existential event 
is one that “happens to us over and above our 
wanting and doing” (Gadamer, 2004, p. xxvi). 
Ricoeur (1984) described an event as some-
thing mediated and constrained. Our experi-
ences happen to us but they are temporal in 
that a subjective perception of an event will 
be dependent on our past and the appropria-
tion of that event will influence our future. 
Risser (1986) stated that the hermeneutic in-
terpretation of event or experience starts from 
one’s perception and, in particular, suggested 
that once we experience something we cannot 
experience it again in the same way because 
“the experience changes the experiencer” (p. 
44).  
 
How I as an experiencer might perceive 
an event will depend on prior conditioning. 
Even though I was told I was a blonde Greek, 
there were enough signs saying otherwise that 
made it possible for me to take up the DNA 
testing. Remembering that, according to Ric-
oeur (1998), we are always “en route,” when 
we experience an event, our history, culture, 
and language will therefore be determined by 
some of what we perceive. Being true to Ric-
oeur, however, means that one must recognize 
that these perceptions are mediated through 
language, or rather, “all discourse is produced 
as an event...but understood as meaning” (p. 
167). My sister’s accusations that I was 
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adopted eventually coupled with my father’s 
disclosure, produced the event of DNA testing. 
A shaky foundation of self and belonging in 
this family already existed, but early on could 
be countered by attestations from my mother 
and father. Receiving the results that I was not 
biologically related to my father answered for 
me some questions about our past relationship, 
but at the same time, my former perceptions 
of family began to crumble.   
 
Ricoeur (2004a) referred to discourse as 
an event because it is referencing something 
“in the intention of saying something about 
something to someone: speaking is the act by 
which language moves beyond itself as a sign 
toward its reference and toward what it en-
counters” (p. 82).  In other words, discourse, 
the use of language, is action. Additionally, 
Ricoeur (1984) wedded events and narratives 
in that one depends on the other since they 
cannot be mutually exclusive; an event will 
exist because it is narrated, and a narration 
exists because of the event.  In particular, nar-
ratives are received and, therefore, narratives 
are always open for another’s interpretation of 
the narration. My sister’s accusations – you 
don’t belong; my emphatic protests – I belong. 
My attestations as a child of belonging how-
ever would only go so far since there were 
constant references otherwise, I don’t look 
like them. Finally, Ricoeur (1992) viewed 
human actions as similar to a text that can be 
interpreted. My father’s disclosure, an action; 
is this a space for interpretation of past 
events? 
 
Ricoeur (1984) saw the usefulness of 
structuralism in the task of hermeneutic inter-
pretation since structuralism assists with re-
vealing the hidden structures in language and 
in recovering meaning. While language is 
primary to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, he does 
not subscribe to linguistics as a primary mode 
of analysis. Rather, Ricoeur stated that text, or 
discourse, “says something about something” 
(p. 78) and that references open up the world 
and our existence in the world. We rescue 
meaning by attending to the language used, 
and we interpret by attending to what lan-
guage points toward. The DNA results point-
ed to a truth. Even though these results are 
definitive, it is possible to find meaning in my 
family experiences in a Greek household. Do 
these results have to unravel everything I un-
derstood about myself? 
 
In Ricoeur’s (2004b) discussion about the 
intention of hermeneutics in relation to the 
interpretation of “every meaningful discourse” 
(p. 4), he stated: 
 
In fact, meaningful discourse is hermeneia, 
“interprets” reality, precisely to the degree 
that it says something of something. 
Moreover, discourse is hermeneia because 
a discursive statement is a grasp of the re-
al meaningful expression, not a selection 
of so-called impressions coming from the 
things themselves. (p. 4) 
 
In other words, we comprehend and make 
meaning of that which is in front of us which 
may open up existential possibilities. Why 
didn’t my father support my extra-curricular 
activities? Why would he look at me that ways 
sometimes? Why would he leave the room? 
Perhaps I have been given the opportunity to 
interpret family interactions in new ways, 
with a new understanding of my otherness. 
Perhaps it is hard to pretend, when you be-
lieve that the child is not yours.  
 
I fondly recall the family talks we had at 
the kitchen table. My father would frequently 
make Sunday dinners and we would sit after-
wards and talk for hours. That is where I 
learned about the digestive usefulness of 
Grand Marnier, that Anita Bryant was an “id-
iot,” and that the Boston Bruins were the best 
hockey team in the NHL. These conversations, 
or discourses, were always about something, 
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and they laid down a foundation for how I 
take up the world today and shaped how I ac-
cepted or rejected my past. For example, 
while I am not a hockey fan, I do drink Grand 
Marnier. More importantly, I began to narrate 
the political world and my actions in it, based 
on these discourses around that kitchen table.   
 
One cannot simply narrate or frame, but, 
according to Ricoeur (1998), context affects 
meaning, and thereby how and where the nar-
ration takes place and what the narration is 
about matters. In a dialogue about interpreta-
tion, Ricoeur (1998) explained that, “sensi-
tivity to context is the necessary complement” 
(p. 44). I do not look like them. Ricoeur 
(1974) was clear to point out that “language is 
innocent – language meaning the tool, the 
code – because it does not speak, it is spoken” 
(p. 91). If narrative matters, as Kearney 
(2004) argued in support of Ricoeur’s posi-
tion, then what we do with a narrative should 
also matter. Therefore, the narrator, not just 
the narration itself, is in need of consideration 
since the narrator is an acting agent, a “who.” 
My father was an acting agent when he dis-
closed my mother’s affair. I was the acting 
agent requesting the DNA test. I knew that 
taking this step would result in solidifying or 
fragmenting my self-understanding as a fami-
ly member and could further unravel the sib-
ling relationships.    
 
In taking up the focus on the concept of 
the “what” of the event, Ricoeur (1992) re-
minded us that a “what” also has a “who,” and 
a “why.” In particular, during Ricoeur’s re-
flections on selfhood, he expressed the im-
portance of the “who” by talking about some-
thing that matters and distinguishing the dif-
ferences between what and who, that is, “how 
can we ask ourselves what matters if we could 
not ask to whom the thing mattered or not? 
Does not the questioning about what matters 
or not depend upon self-concern, which in-
deed seems to be constitutive of self-hood” 
(Ricoeur 1992, p. 137)? At the time I decided 
biological or not, he was my father...I regret-
ted not asking...how do I understand myself 
now in light of this new information?   
 
It is important to discuss intentionality in 
relation to this existential event since it con-
nects Ricoeur’s theory and the way in which 
existential events create or limit possibilities 
for self-understanding. When deliberating 
about intention, Ricoeur (1992) referred to the 
importance of the “what” and “who” of action. 
Ricoeur (2004b) stated that interpretation has 
an intention to match reader, “who,” and text 
“what,” “thereby incorporating its meaning 
into the present comprehension a man is able 
to have of himself” (p. 4).  Ricoeur would 
likely say that we know ourselves through our 
actions and our actions lead us toward self-
narration.   
 
Narrating Events 
 
Narration, according to Ricoeur (1984), in-
volves emplotment; the making of an event 
into a story. A plot has a direction and accord-
ing to Ricoeur (1998), “an event must be 
more than a singular occurrence: it must be 
defined in terms of its contribution to the de-
velopment of a plot” (p. 277). Ricoeur (1984) 
described the importance of the plot having 
direction so that we follow along and by do-
ing so we are able to make meaning of the 
story being narrated, in particular, to reflect 
upon the story, and to integrate the meaning 
made into our own existence and human ac-
tion. However, Ricoeur (1984) was also clear 
to point out that “emplotment is never the 
simple triumph of order” (p. 73). While my 
life has had a direction forward, it is in the 
backward glance to events along the way, the 
way he looks at me, my sister’s attestations, 
you may not be my child, that prompted the 
action of requesting a DNA test which then 
leads to a continuation of the plot; the frag-
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menting of my self-understating and reinvent-
ing myself.  
 
In his discussion of Aristotle’s Poetics, 
Ricoeur (1984) described the art of compos-
ing as “organizing the events into a system” 
(p. 33) or, in other words, a plot or “muthos” 
(p. 31).   Since historical events are construct-
ed narratives (Ricoeur, 1988), the historian or 
narrator interprets that event and therefore, 
historical accounts, for example, Turkey in-
vaded Greece, are not the same as natural 
events such as earthquakes. These historical 
accounts weave through our personal narra-
tives to augment the plot we are creating 
about who we are and how we belong, Greeks 
were once blonde and blue eyed; I should be-
lieve them. Ricoeur (1992) recognized the op-
portunity for narrations to highlight human 
potential, and the possibilities for action.    
  
Narratives assist in mediating events 
across time thereby creating a meaningful 
whole and recognition that reality may be 
temporal. My narrative as a Greek existed 
temporarily and was established only through 
discourse; the signs said otherwise. Ricoeur’s 
(1984) ideas about narrative took up history 
and fiction, both of which involve time. Fic-
tional narratives may draw on actual events, 
and they are representations of such. Histori-
cal narratives may involve the recounting of 
empirical events (Ricoeur, 1984). In order for 
historical events, for example, to be appropri-
ately narrated it must remain in its context 
and contribute to a plot (Ricoeur, 1984). Ric-
oeur (1998; 2004c) argued that historical ac-
counts are narrative in that they account for 
real events and those narratives that accom-
pany them. In particular, Ricoeur (1998) stat-
ed, “however fictional the historical text may 
be it claims nevertheless to be a representa-
tion of reality.  In other words history is both 
a literary artefact (and in this sense a fiction) 
and a representation of reality” (p. 291). Tur-
key really did invade Greece hence my 
blondeness. The reality however, is that I am 
not an offspring of this Greek man. Ricoeur 
(1984) suggested that the past is only accessi-
ble to us through our narratives since “when it 
was present, this past was like our present, 
confused, multiform, and unintelligible” (p. 
99). Therefore, “there is only a history of the 
potentialities of the present” (Ricoeur, 1998, p. 
295). The present reality affords me the op-
portunity to reinvent my future identity - - to 
re-narrate myself.  
 
The Narrated Self 
 
We can see how Ricoeur’s thinking about 
temporality affects the narrative self and the 
ways in which time folded upon itself, reflect-
ing back, can create a discordant-concordant 
dynamic. In particular, entering into a discus-
sion about the way in which we come to have 
stability as a narrated self through time, Ric-
oeur (1992) distinguished the identity as hav-
ing an ipse-identity and an idem-identity. He 
pointed out that these two parts are not neces-
sarily found on a continuum, from one end of 
identity to the other, but rather contribute in 
different ways to an identity. Additionally, he 
claimed that these two parts of the self both 
depart yet intersect and endure through time. 
Narrative identity lies between ipse and idem 
identity and is mediated by them and links 
actions and ethics with identity since “there is 
no ethically neutral narrative” (Ricoeur, 1992, 
p. 115).  
 
The ipse, also called selfhood (Ricoeur, 
1992), is the part of the self that is a reflexive 
being and has self-constancy. The term con-
stancy in this context does not relate to a stat-
ic composition but rather a self that is carried 
forward through time, thereby weaving 
through horizons of the past, present and fu-
ture and through interpretations and re-
interpretations. In my case, as an example, 
having thought I was Greek sits in the past, 
now that I know my father is not my father. 
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How I bring the DNA results into my present 
and future is a matter of how I might interpret 
what father means, or what it means to have 
been brought up in a Greek household.  Ipse 
is also defined by Ricoeur as one’s bond or 
making and keeping a promise. I shared the 
results of the DNA testing as I said I would. In 
other words, the ipse relates to the human ac-
tivities that are maintained as a claiming of 
the self to the self. For example, in relation to 
keeping one’s word, Ricoeur (1992) ex-
plained that the ipse appears to “stand as a 
challenge to time, a denial of change” (p. 124), 
since keeping one’s word or promise is done 
so regardless of time or circumstances. A 
promise speaks to the esteem we give our-
selves and to others, and recognizes that lan-
guage is the place where we extend ourselves 
to others through time. Ipse, therefore, is an-
chored in the presence of an other than self, 
since it is related to our actions. I shared the 
results of the DNA testing. According to Ric-
oeur (1992), it is at this juncture that ipse and 
idem depart.   
 
The idem, what Ricoeur (1992) also called 
sameness, differs from the ipse in that the 
idem relates to the continuity of an individu-
al’s dimensions over time. While there may 
be some changes over time to these features, 
they will always maintain some permanence; 
that is, time could be said to “threaten resem-
blance without destroying it” (Ricoeur, p. 
117). It was important for Ricoeur to move 
beyond the mind-body dichotomy, where 
identity was concerned. Idem, or personal 
identity, is not strictly substance, such as 
brain or body continuity, for example, I am 
blonde and blue eyed, but is also related to 
traits or habits that become incorporated into 
the self to the point where one is recognizable 
as the same through actions. Ricoeur called 
the idem the “’what’ of the ‘who’” (p. 122).  I 
am tentative with my older sister and always 
have been. 
According to Ricoeur (1992), both idem and 
ipse have constancy, permanency in time, and 
while separate, they may overlap. Ricoeur 
described that the ipse and idem sometimes 
overlap, and “this overlapping, however, does 
not abolish the difference separating the two 
problematics: precisely as second nature, my 
character is me, myself, ipse; but this ipse an-
nounces itself as idem” (p. 121). At the same 
time, however, these parts of our identity are 
separate, in that “keeping one’s word express-
es a self-constancy which cannot be inscribed 
as character was…the perseverance of charac-
ter is one thing, the perseverance of faithful-
ness to a word that has been given is some-
thing else again” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 123). 
Since the ipse and idem are “two modes of 
being” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 308), they must find 
an accord, in that, the constancy of one relies 
on the constancy of the other, and, through 
contracting with one another the ipse and 
idem negotiate the narrated, capable self. At 
the time, since I was appreciating the adult 
relationship I had gained with my father, it 
did not matter if he was biologically connect-
ed or not. Over time this changed for me. I 
had to negotiate between completing the 
DNA testing and potentially breach my word, 
regardless you are my father, or if I my own 
curiosity, spurred by my never-ending suspi-
cion, was honouring my need for self-
understanding. Time was also a factor since 
my brother was ill. Negotiating the idem and 
ipse was necessary for my plot to continue.     
 
In a discussion about the “capable self,” 
Ricoeur (1992) pulled in the concept of re-
flexivity and explained that our reflexive na-
ture allows us to ask questions about identity, 
that is, the “who.” What does it mean now 
that I know I am not Greek? Does this infor-
mation have to disintegrate my self-
understanding? One of the ways in which 
Ricoeur suggested that we know we persist 
through time is through such activities as 
speaking, action, and responsibility. There is a 
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certainty about our existence, which Ricoeur 
called “attestation.” Essentially, attestation 
refers to one’s ability to attest to his or herself 
and to the ability to be responsible for that 
declaration. I do belong; You may not be my 
child. Ricoeur reminded us that, whatever we 
attest to, be it the world or self, attestation is 
mediated.   
 
The narrated self is fragile (Ricoeur 1992). 
According to Ricoeur, since we are narrating 
ourselves on both actual and constituted expe-
riences, we are always becoming and con-
stantly refiguring ourselves. However, by us-
ing either fiction or historical accounts, we 
are able to uncover meaning and transform 
ourselves. Attestation helps us decide about 
conflicting accounts of the narrative self 
(Ricoeur, 1992). To what can we attest? If I 
am confused, are there facts that I can orient 
myself toward that will assist with the conflict 
and, therefore, assist with settling on a partic-
ular narrative? I am blonde, I am not Greek. I 
don’t look like him, he is not my father. Nev-
ertheless, according to Ricoeur (1998), in or-
der to attest, these facts or narratives must be 
acceptable and plausible. Turkey did invade 
Greece, could my difference be the result of a 
recessive gene? 
 
Temporality, Narrative, and Action 
 
“...time becomes human to the extent that it is 
articulated through a narrative mode, and 
narrative attains its full meaning when it be-
comes a condition of temporal existence.” 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p. 52) 
 
Narratives or stories are the ways in which we 
make sense of temporality, that is, “the world 
unfolded by every narrative work is a tem-
poral world” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 3). We are 
able to describe human actions through mi-
mesis, a pre-figuring, configuring and re-
figuring of actions based on what has gone 
before, how we interpret the past, and where 
it takes us. We bring the past into the present 
to inform us and therefore, create narratives. 
In order to illuminate narrative activity and 
temporality, Ricoeur (1984) described a 
“three-fold mimesis” (p. 52), which included 
mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3.    
 
Mimesis1 (pre-figuration) refers to our 
pre-understandings of practical action. Three 
layers lie within memisis1 including the struc-
tural use of language in that language assists 
with the understanding of action. A second 
layer relates to the ways in which symbols 
assist in narrations, and the ways in which 
contexts will inform narrations. I don’t look 
like them, maybe my sister is right. Finally, 
actions have a temporal nature as seen in the 
language of adverbs, for example, “now,” I 
am not Greek, and “then” I am Greek. Mime-
sis2 (configuration) acts as a mediating role 
between memisis1 and memisis3 and assists 
the reader in following a plot. A plot then be-
comes configured when this mediating func-
tion “transforms the events or incidents into a 
story” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 65). Emplotment 
refers to the ways in which we organize, or 
configure, activities into a plot. I was Greek, I 
am not Greek anymore. Where does all my 
understanding as a Greek now reside? Finally, 
mimesis3 (re-figuration) refers to the ways in 
which a reading or interaction could influence 
a change or re-figure our being-in-the-world 
and allow possibilities to arise. What will I tell 
my grandchildren about their lineage?   
 
Ricoeur (1984) explained that these forms 
of mimesis provide a creative tension that 
work together to relate time to narrative and 
create human time. In essence, Ricoeur 
showed how these forms depend on one an-
other in both time and narrative, in that “we 
are following therefore the destiny of a pre-
figured time that becomes a refigured time 
through the mediation of a configured time” 
(p. 54). Concerned that he may be creating a 
vicious circle, Ricoeur dealt with this dilem-
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ma by discussing the transitory functions be-
tween the forms, or mimesis. While recogniz-
ing that the circular nature of narrative and 
time do not stop, Ricoeur stated, “I would ra-
ther speak of an endless spiral that would car-
ry the mediation past the same point a number 
of times, but at different altitudes” (p. 72). 
 
Ricoeur’s (1984, 1985, 1988) work in his 
three volumes of Time and Narrative illus-
trated that historical accounts are more than 
facts since they are constructed and narrated 
events. Narratives allow us to make sense of 
ourselves, and by organizing our life events 
into a plot, we humanize time that might oth-
erwise become “fragmented moments” 
(Kearney, 2002, p. 4). According to Ricoeur 
(1988), time becomes humanized because we 
narrate and, therefore, we move time from the 
cosmos and merge with it into our lives. Em-
plotment changes chronological time into re-
lationships between humans and time and in 
particular, the beginning, middle, and end (not 
necessarily in that order) of a narration creates 
temporality, while at the same time it helps 
create unity. Ricoeur (1985) suggested that 
narratives allow us to play with time, for ex-
ample, our use of verb tenses. I have a father, 
I had a father, I am Greek, I was Greek. We 
are acting agents in human time, and our ac-
tions will leave its mark on historical time, 
which could then be brought into the future. 
My father’s disclosure, I opted for DNA test-
ing, and I will never be Greek. We need 
chronological time in order to make sense of 
past and new experiences, to provide them a 
place in time, after my father’s death. The 
lived present allows us to have new begin-
nings, possibilities, and the “narrative identity 
continues to make and unmake itself” (Ric-
oeur, 1988, p. 249). I can take up Ricoeur’s 
linking of time and narrative, and unapologet-
ically reconstruct a past narrative and change 
the mark I leave in historical time.   
 
Ricoeur (1980) spoke of the telling and re-
telling of a story or narrative as one of the 
connections we have with temporality. For 
example, in the telling of a story he discussed 
the structure of a narrative as having a begin-
ning, middle, and an end (Ricoeur, 1980). 
When a plot is structured in such a way, there 
is what he called a “then” an “and then,” or a 
“so on” (Ricoeur, 1980, p. 179), which are the 
connecting episodes that involve both plot 
(narrative) and time (and then). In this way, 
we follow along in present cosmic time even 
though a story may itself take place at differ-
ent time. Greece was invaded, that is why you 
are blonde. When a story is re-told, it changes 
its place in cosmic time. Now the story has a 
history because of the recollecting that takes 
place. Ricoeur (1980) suggested that the func-
tion of a narrative is related to human actions 
and that our actions lead to narratives that be-
come temporal structures. In essence, Ricoeur 
(1988) suggested, “we are affected by history 
and that we affect ourselves by the history we 
make” (p. 213). Greece was invaded and 
therefore fewer blondes, but I see the differ-
ences in how you treated me, I want to know, 
I will do the testing, I am not yours.  
 
In relation to narratives and plots, Ricoeur 
(1984, 1985, 1992) described a dynamic pro-
cess involving concordant and discordant el-
ements, that is, the arrangements of fact and 
reversals of fortune within a story. My sister 
was right. In much the same way, we con-
struct our own stories and act as the charac-
ters within that story. I want to know for sure; 
my suspicions will not abate. We follow a plot 
and, through time, we weave the events that 
take place in our lives into a meaningful 
whole. I was a sibling and I am now a half-
sibling.    
 
Plot and character are dynamic elements 
of a narrative and “it is the identity of the sto-
ry that makes the identity of the character” 
(Ricoeur, 1992, p.148); however, these ele-
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ments must be credible. Essentially, the char-
acter acts and is acted upon, and we evaluate 
the actions of the character, and in so doing 
we identify with the character and the story. 
Ricoeur (1992) believed that human lives are 
readable, and are even more readable when 
the stories people tell of themselves are told 
through historical or fictional narratives, 
which, in turn, are interpreted into our own 
lives. The stories my father told me about 
Greece being invaded were historical narra-
tives which allowed an interpretation of 
Greeks being blonde and blue eyed. Therefore, 
I did belong, I was Greek. These narratives of 
life are never complete, however (Ricoeur, 
1988), until the story is over. I’m going to die, 
you need to know, I may not be your father.  
 
Ricoeur (1992) recognized also that our 
narratives are not created in a vacuum; we are 
enmeshed in prior stories and tradition along 
with others. We encounter others, within a 
cultural context and these interactions con-
tribute to our own narratives. They say I am 
Greek, I don’t look like them, I don’t want to 
be adopted, I want to belong. These interac-
tions assist us in determining our actions. 
Protests, asking parents. Our narratives start 
to weave with those of others, and we create 
stories about our shared identity. I reflect on 
those discussions at the kitchen table. For ex-
ample, my narrative is constituted by the fact 
that I am a sibling and have been told stories 
about what that means. Additionally, we have 
a heritage. This heritage is constituted through 
historical narratives, having been told through 
the ages, for example, the way in which a fa-
ther is taken up in a particular culture. There-
fore, the changes I encountered about the bi-
ology of my father becomes existential be-
cause of the meanings passed down, from not 
only my own family, but these meanings are 
also encapsulated in the narratives that have 
been told about fathers for centuries, for ex-
ample, myths, particularly those stemming 
from a Greek culture.  
We are affected by our past that is not 
created by us; we have a picture of the present 
mediated through our cultural landscapes. 
However, our actions throw us into the future 
and in doing so we potentially change our-
selves. I have done the testing, I am not Greek. 
We become actors in the world, while being 
constituted by our past; however, we also 
have freedom (Ricoeur, 1992). All narratives, 
whether real or fictional, according to Ricoeur 
(1992), have some ethical element. For Ric-
oeur (1992), our human actions are located in 
time and space, and while time and space may 
act as a constraint, these root us and enable us 
to view a persistent self. Additionally, Ric-
oeur (1998) suggested that we recognize our-
selves and take responsibility for our actions 
through self-examination. If I didn’t want the 
answer why did I do the testing? In short, 
Ricoeur (1998) said that we learn about our-
selves through acts that are exterior to the self, 
which then return to us, with information, 
through others or symbols. We then take that 
information, evaluate it, and examine it to de-
termine meaning. Does parental lineage mat-
ter? 
 
Acting Agents and Human Capability 
 
Throughout Ricoeur’s (1992) work, there is 
reference to an agent’s acting and suffering 
“for my part, I will never forget to speak of 
humans as acting and suffering” (p. 145). Suf-
fering comes from the misery experienced 
when the self is not yet realised, but it is seen 
in potential for action (Hall, 2007). According 
to Ricoeur (1988), we find axial moments, 
which give structure to time and connect us to 
events in historical time, moments that have 
left a trace, and “to follow a trace is one way 
of ‘reckoning with time’” (p.124). In order to 
“reckon with time,” we give utterance to 
events, and in particular speak of actions. Ac-
tions move what is potential toward actuality. 
I may not be your father; my brother is ill, I 
should do the testing; I am not his.   
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Actions leave a mark in time, a trace, 
much like a text is archived, and therefore, 
according to Ricoeur (1992), human action 
can be interpreted. Why didn’t my parents tell 
me? Why did my father wait until he was 
close to death? Why didn’t I ever ask my 
mother about my biological father? Our ac-
tions, or inactions, can be interpreted. Perhaps 
my mother’s guilt kept her from telling me; 
perhaps my father had a part to play in her 
affair; perhaps it did not matter to him either 
until we had a better relationship. Actions, 
according to Ricoeur (1992), can be studied 
“following a three-step rhythm: describing, 
narrating, prescribing” (p. 20). Essentially, 
this process assists in moving from practice to 
ethics since prescribing involves judgment, 
“good” or “bad.” Through narratives, we have 
received models or descriptions of how to act; 
through reading or dialogue we access our 
imagination and apply that to the real world 
and, therefore, we can act. My father was a 
generous man; it would not be outside of his 
character to welcome a child that was not his, 
even if I was a reminder for him of my moth-
er’s infidelity.   
 
Distanciation and Appropriation 
 
In order to judge one’s act, or to examine 
one’s self, there needs to be a certain amount 
of distance. Ricoeur (1992, 1998) used the 
term distanciation to describe the act of ob-
jectifying a text (or discourse, or self) in order 
for it to be liberated. Once distanced, interpre-
tation is no longer tied to the original intent 
and, therefore, can be brought forward to be 
made meaningful to the person in the present. 
It is not what the statistical analysis of DNA 
results mean, but rather what they mean to me 
given my past and present, and what it means 
about my heritage. 
 
In the process of experiencing and inter-
preting an event, it is not necessarily the event 
that endures, but the meaning and “the inter-
pretation becomes an event” (Ricoeur, 1998, 
p. 185).  What does having a father mean and 
what does having a Greek father mean? In his 
discussion in relation to distanciation and ap-
propriation, Ricoeur (1998) explained that we 
do not “impose” ourselves on a text, but ra-
ther we “expose” ourselves in order to dis-
cover a “proposed” world (pp. 142-143).  As 
we distanciate the original intention of the 
text, we expose ourselves, use our imagina-
tion (reflect), and we invite “new possibilities 
of being-in-the-world” (Ricoeur, 1998, p. 
142) and we become an enlarged self. While 
distance frees meaning, appropriation allows 
us to make the meaning familiar. In particular, 
Ricoeur claimed that “distanciation, in all its 
forms and figures, constitutes par excellence 
the critical moment in understanding” (p. 113). 
 
Action 
 
Much of Ricoeur’s (1984, 1985, 1988, 1998) 
work on narrative relates to the way in which 
we interact with a text. As we read, we also 
re-read ourselves through the varied charac-
ters and the plots. We evaluate the character’s 
actions and potentially “elevate them to the 
rank of persons” (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 41). Much 
like the reading of a novel, we respond to the 
people in our lives in similar ways. We inter-
pret the actions of others and attend to the so-
cial and public spheres.   
  
Inherent in our ability to be an acting 
agent is our corporeality. My body interacts in 
the world, and I have a “corporeal anchoring 
in the world” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 150.). Human 
capacity is conditional since the body will be 
either active or passive depending on needs or 
desires and interactions with others (Hall, 
2007; Muldoon, 2002). I could have chosen 
not to complete the DNA testing and accepted 
a state of not knowing. Our needs or desires 
have the potential to direct activity, while our 
bodily senses ground our existence in the 
world. Furthermore, according to Ricoeur (as 
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cited in Kearney, 2004), our perceptions are 
subject to emotions. Because of the early 
childhood distance I perceived our relation-
ship in a certain way. As I got to know my 
father, as an adult, I became more emotionally 
connected. Had I remained emotionally dis-
tant, the DNA results may not have spurred 
me to wonder existentially about what it 
means to have been brought up Greek, with a 
Greek father. Accordingly, our openness to 
the world and our ability to interpret and en-
gage will depend on our affective perception. 
Am I sad or happy about the DNA results? 
Affective perceptions will either open us to a 
world of possibility or limit openness due to 
vulnerability. I have a new understanding of 
being a half-sibling. I resent my sister for be-
ing right, and I will likely avoid her in the fu-
ture.   
  
Our freedom is revealed through our char-
acter. Apparently, Ricoeur (as cited in Mul-
doon, 2002) believed that we want to repre-
sent our ideal self and strive toward happiness. 
The desire for happiness leads to our percep-
tion of possibilities for our human capacity 
(Ricoeur, 1992). Happiness, however, being 
an emotion, may be in conflict with reason 
and, therefore, contributes to our frailty. 
While we are cognizant of our frailty and we 
may feel misery because of it, these condi-
tions, lead us to actions, and a will to respond. 
Does the biology of my father matter? Should 
I do the testing? What do I understand about 
myself now that I know I am not Greek and 
only partially related to this family? What 
does it mean to be without a cultural lineage?   
 
Ricoeur’s (1992) work pointed to the im-
portance of choices and actions in the world 
with others. We exist with others and, our in-
teractions with others can inform us when we 
reflect on our human capacity. Narratives help 
us mediate within our public spaces. Engage-
ment with others is key to our selfhood (Ric-
oeur, 1992), and narratives direct our action to 
live communally. What should I tell others 
when they ask about the origin of my last 
name? Others can assist in attestations and 
verify truths. My brother’s DNA is unlike my 
own. On the other hand, others could provide 
a different perspective. You are our child.   
 
Self-Understanding 
 
“...reflection is nothing without the mediation 
of signs and works, and the explanation is 
nothing if not incorporated as an intermedi-
ary stage in the process of self-understanding.” 
(Ricoeur, 1998, p. 159). 
 
The past and present confront one another and 
merge together, and as we interpret the past, 
we bring new meaning made into the present, 
which leads to an increased self-
understanding. Self-understanding is mediat-
ed through reflection, and “the self of self-
knowledge is the fruit of an examined life” 
(Ricoeur, 1988, p. 247). When we reflect not 
only on ourselves but also on the community 
in which we live, we attest to ourselves about 
who we are and how we live. The external 
environment, our community or culture will 
validate this attestation, which over time will 
also lead to self-constancy. Existential events 
offer opportunities for a re-reading of the self 
when examined for the ways in which narra-
tives have shaped both the self and the inter-
pretation of the events. Existential events cre-
ate a temporality of experience. Time be-
comes humanized in the way that we respond 
to our history, bring it into the present and in 
consideration of the future. While engaged in 
this self-examination we may stay true to our-
selves; however, we may also critique the nar-
ratives that have created who we are now, and 
through the dialect between present under-
standing and potential, we may become re-
figured, considering that “understanding is 
not concerned with grasping a fact but with 
apprehending a possibility of being” (Ricoeur, 
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1998, p. 56). Since we reside in both actuality 
and potential, we are always becoming. 
 
Ricoeur and My Self-Understanding  
 
While I was narrated to believe that family is 
of the utmost importance, I had gradually dis-
tanced myself from my family for many years, 
that is, until my father became ill and I decid-
ed to return home. I had one opportunity to 
get to know him by means of having an adult 
relationship with him and I was willing to see 
where it would go, thereby being open to the 
possibilities. This prior distancing (distancia-
tion) of myself from my family allowed me to 
face new experiences that were taken up (ap-
propriated) into a newly developing identity. 
This process was not easy and it certainly was 
not fast, nor is it over.   
 
When I returned to Victoria, I found a 
family that had remained closed, isolated, and 
stuck in the past (limited, misery). Our rela-
tionships were frail for several years as we 
attempted to create new narrations out of our 
shared present. However, the narrations of the 
past continued to loom over us. Eventually, as 
my father’s illness became more serious, he 
began to talk openly about his life. Since I 
was the only family member willing to talk 
about death and dying, he shared many stories 
with me, many of which I was later honoured 
to share at his funeral. In particular, he told 
me that it was likely that I was not his child 
(existential event). While this fact had always 
been a rumour, it did not concern me so much 
in my past because in the past I had no real 
relationship with him (memesis1). Then, sud-
denly, through our shared present, back in my 
family context as an adult (memesis2) I rec-
ognized him as a person, a father, who had 
not been there before. I knew then that I was 
going to miss him (mimesis3).      
 
This event helped me to reflect on the 
characteristics (ipse/idem) that I now possess, 
which are both inherited and mediated. When 
I consider the culturally and socially mediated 
values I possess, I know by letting go and re-
jecting some, while maintaining others, my 
narrated self has been moving forward 
through time and my identity has shifted. I 
continue to question what it means to have a 
biological lineage on this earth, that is, won-
dering if somehow it ties me to the human 
race in a certain way, or perhaps not knowing 
my biology creates more freedom and less 
othering (self and other than self).   
 
Through a series of events, my relation-
ship with my brother has become strained to 
the point in which we had not spoken for a 
long time. For certain, I have had no relation-
ship to speak of with my oldest sister for 
many years. Recently, I received a call that 
my brother had been diagnosed terminally ill. 
I needed to decide whether my ties to this 
family were strong enough to warrant a visit, 
particularly since I would likely encounter my 
older sister. I was called upon to muster up 
my human capacity to care (ethics and action). 
I went to Victoria and visited my family. 
While visiting with my family, we had many 
conversations, some about death and dying, 
which brought us around to discussions about 
our parents.   
 
The DNA test results were discussed and 
once again, particularly noting, that I was not 
biologically connected to my father, and that I 
was not Greek (referent). While, in the past I 
had protested, I now knew (attesta-
tion/verification) that it was true that he was 
not my father; however, my protests contin-
ued, but changed, since, as my partner contin-
ues to remind me, “Just because he was not 
your father, does not mean your father was 
not Greek.”    
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